

## The Senate Should Confirm John Bolton

### *Executive Summary*

- John Bolton has been ably serving as the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations since President Bush appointed him to that position during a Senate recess in August 2005. This recess appointment expires at the end of this Congressional session, and President Bush has resubmitted Ambassador Bolton's nomination to the Senate.
  - When the initial nomination reached the Senate floor, a filibuster prevented an up-or-down vote, even though a majority of senators supported a cloture motion to end debate.
- Opponents of the nomination have claimed that Ambassador Bolton "can't work with others." This charge, if ever credible, has now been laid to rest by his role in securing passage of unanimous Security Council resolutions on critical security issues in the Middle East and North Korea, as well as a resolution on Iran.
- The resolution on the situation in the Middle East called for a cessation of hostilities and created a foundation for a sustainable peace; it also guaranteed Israel's right to defend itself.
- He also led the Security Council to condemn North Korea's missile launches and "require" member states to prevent missile and missile-related items, goods, and technology from being transferred to, or procured from, North Korea.
- The Council also passed a resolution, with the affirmative support of China and Russia—not just their abstentions—demanding that Iran halt its nuclear weapons activities, and expressing the Council's intention to adopt appropriate measures, i.e., sanctions, if Iran has not complied with this resolution by a date certain.
- Ambassador Bolton is also a tireless and tenacious advocate for reform of an organization that is in dire need of it.
- Many authorities have recognized this outstanding work, as five past Secretaries of State, three Secretaries of Defense, and over sixty former U.S. Ambassadors have endorsed his nomination.
- He has served with distinction as the country's representative at the United Nations, and the President wishes that Ambassador Bolton continue to serve in that position.
- Ambassador Bolton's record of service demonstrates that he should be confirmed.

## Introduction

Ambassador John Bolton has been serving as the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations since President Bush appointed him to that position during a Senate recess in August 2005. This appointment expires at the end of this Congressional session.

President Bush resubmitted the nomination of Ambassador John Bolton to the Senate last year, and it is currently pending before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Last year, when the nomination reached the Senate floor, a filibuster prevented an up-or-down vote. Some opponents threaten another filibuster, raising criticisms about Ambassador Bolton's ability to work with others. This charge, if ever credible, has now been laid to rest by his role in securing passage of unanimous Security Council resolutions on critical security issues in the Middle East and North Korea, as well as a resolution on Iran. Moreover, Ambassador Bolton is a tireless and tenacious advocate for reform of an organization that is in dire need of it. He has served with distinction as the country's representative at the United Nations, and the President wishes that Ambassador Bolton continue to serve in that position. Ambassador Bolton's record of service demonstrates that he should be confirmed so that he may continue to serve his country in this critical role at this critical juncture in history.

## Procedural Posture

John R. Bolton has a distinguished public policy career. He has been confirmed by the Senate to positions of government service five separate times, most recently in 2001 as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.<sup>1</sup> On March 7, 2005, President Bush nominated him to be the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. A minority of the Senate filibustered the nomination and rejected a cloture motion on two separate occasions, on May 26, 2005 and on June 20, 2005, even though a majority of senators supported the motion.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, the nomination never proceeded to an up-or-down vote.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Lugar, Opening Statement of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before a Committee hearing on the nomination of John Bolton to be the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, July 27, 2006. Ambassador Bolton has also served as the General Counsel for the United States Agency for International Development (1981-82), USAID Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination (1982-83), Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs (1985-88), and the Civil Division (1988-89), and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (1989-93).

<sup>2</sup> 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., Vote 129 (May 26, 2005); 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., Vote 142 (June 20, 2005).

<sup>3</sup> This is not the only time the minority has blocked a nomination to a critical national security position. They are currently blocking, or have blocked at one point, the following nominations:

- Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England (recessed before confirmed);
- Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Eric Edelman (recessed before confirmed);
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Peter Flory (still being filibustered);
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence General Counsel, Ben Powell (recessed before confirmed);
- Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Kenneth Wainstein (still being blocked);
- Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Division, Alice Fisher (recessed); and
- Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Steven Bradbury (still being blocked).

Despite this obstruction, the President determined that the United States needed a permanent representative at the United Nations during a time of war, and that Mr. Bolton's presence there was essential to the national interest. Thus, on August 1, 2005, during the Congressional recess, President Bush used his constitutional authority to appoint John Bolton to serve as the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.<sup>4</sup> This recess appointment expires at the end of this Senate session, and Ambassador Bolton would not be eligible to be paid his salary if he were to be given another recess appointment.<sup>5</sup> On September 19, 2005, President Bush resubmitted Ambassador Bolton's nomination to the Senate.<sup>6</sup> On July 27, 2006, the Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on his nomination. A business meeting to consider the nomination is scheduled for September 7, 2006.

## **Forceful Voice Protecting Interests of United States and Allies**

In 2005, Ambassador Bolton deserved, *at a minimum*, an up-or-down vote on his nomination. Now, given his extraordinary record of service at the United Nations, it seems evident that the Ambassador merits not only an up-or-down vote, but the Senate's confirmation.

### **Defending Israel from Terrorist Attacks**

Ambassador Bolton has been a tireless advocate of Israel's right to defend itself against terrorist attacks; as he and President Bush recognize it is precisely this right of self-defense that the United States is exercising in its war against the radical Islamist terrorists. President Bush praised the Ambassador for leading the Security Council to pass a resolution unanimously that calls for a cessation of hostilities and creates a foundation for a sustainable peace.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, as the Ambassador said, Security Council Resolution 1701 "guarantees Israel's right to defend itself."<sup>8</sup> In this regard, his leadership demonstrably rebuts his critics' assertion that Ambassador Bolton "can't work with others," as he was able to secure a unanimous Security Council Resolution on one of the most divisive issues in international affairs in a forum that is decidedly anti-Israel.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.").

<sup>5</sup> United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, Permissibility of Recess Appointments of Directors of the Federal Housing Finance Board, 15 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 91 (Dec. 13, 1991) (interpreting the Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5503, to prohibit the payment of compensation to successive recess appointees if the position's salary is derived from appropriated funds).

<sup>6</sup> Nomination number PN911. The nomination of a recess appointee is resubmitted to the Senate in order to allow the appointee to be paid under the strictures and demands of the Pay Act. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 5503(b) (requiring that the nomination of a recess appointee being paid under an exception to the Pay Act be resubmitted to the Senate). It is the renomination that is before the Senate.

<sup>7</sup> George W. Bush, President's Weekly Radio Address, Aug. 19, 2006. The Security Council passed Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> John R. Bolton, Statement of the United States Representative to the United Nations before the Security Council, Aug. 22, 2006, *available at* [http://www.un.int/usa/06\\_210.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/06_210.htm).

<sup>9</sup> The newly formed United Nations Human Rights Council illustrates this clearly. At its inaugural session from June 19-30, 2006, the Council passed exactly one country-specific resolution, placing the human rights violations of Israel on the agenda for the next session. Additionally, on July 5, the Council convened its first-ever special session to address "the human rights violations in the occupied Palestinian territory caused by the recent Israeli military operations against Palestinian civilians." At the end of the special session, the Council passed a resolution to,

While engaging in the diplomatic negotiations required to secure a unanimous resolution, Ambassador Bolton never compromised his principles or lost his voice of moral clarity in support of freedom. He recognizes, as President Bush does, that “the conflict in Lebanon is part of a broader struggle between freedom and terror that is unfolding across the region.”<sup>10</sup> Ambassador Bolton articulated how the cause of this crisis unmistakably lies with Hezbollah,<sup>11</sup> which carried out an unprovoked terrorist incursion across an international border into sovereign territory to kidnap Israeli soldiers.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, he made clear that Hezbollah’s refusal to release the abducted soldiers, along with its intentional and direct targeting of Israeli civilians, is what perpetuated the crisis—as opposed to Israel’s military operations.<sup>13</sup> Ambassador Bolton consistently rebuts misplaced criticisms that the United States and Israel are obstacles to peace in the region, and speaks forcibly in support of a country’s right to defend itself against terrorist attacks.

### **Protecting the United States from North Korea’s Provocative Acts**

Ambassador Bolton’s leadership is also evident from his efforts to address threats from North Korea. On July 4, 2006, North Korea defied the collective will of its neighbors in testing seven ballistic missiles in violation of several international commitments it had made. These tests included the launch of a Taepo-dong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is being developed for the sole purpose of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States. On July 15, 2006, owing to the leadership of Ambassador Bolton and his Japanese counterpart, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695, condemning the North Korean missile launches. The resolution, by its terms, “requires” member states to prevent missile and missile-related items, goods, and technology from being transferred to, or procured from, North Korea.<sup>14</sup>

Once again, this unanimous resolution undermines the criticism that Ambassador Bolton “can’t work with others.” Rather, it demonstrates Ambassador Bolton’s diplomatic ability to persuade Security Council members to move forward on issues. Resolution 1695 is the first Security Council resolution pertaining to North Korea passed since 1993, and it stands in

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among other things, express grave concern with the human rights violations caused by Israeli occupation and demand that Israel “abide scrupulously by the provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights law.” Human Rights Council Special Session Resolution S-1/Res.1, ¶ 2 (July 6, 2006), *available at* <http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/S-1Res.1.pdf>. The resolution made no mention of other violations of human rights laws, such as the rockets Palestinians have fired into Israeli cities, or the incursion into sovereign Israeli territory by Palestinians for the express purpose of abducting an Israeli soldier.

<sup>10</sup> Bolton, Aug. 22, 2006 (quoting Bush, Aug. 19, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> The State Department has designated Hezbollah a terrorist group. Hezbollah operates mainly out of southern Lebanon, with established cells throughout the world. It receives political, financial, and logistical support from Iran and Syria. United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, Apr. 2006, pp. 197-99.

<sup>12</sup> Bolton, Aug. 22, 2006 (“Responsibility for this conflict rests squarely on the shoulders [of] Hezbollah.”).

<sup>13</sup> John R. Bolton, Remarks of the United States Representative to the United Nations before a stakeout outside the Security Council, July 20, 2006, *available at* [http://www.un.int/usa/06\\_178.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/06_178.htm) (noting that the reason the crisis continued was Hezbollah’s “terrorizing [of] innocent civilians and [refusal to] give up the kidnapped Israeli soldiers”).

<sup>14</sup> Security Council Resolution 1695 ¶¶ 3 & 4 (July 15, 2006).

contradistinction to the Security Council's response to North Korea's launch of missiles over Japan on August 31, 1998. After those launches, the Security Council convened to discuss the matter, but its only action was to issue a press statement that Ambassador Bolton has described as feckless.<sup>15</sup> The resolution also makes clear that "the disagreement is not fundamentally a bilateral disagreement between North Korea and the United States. It's a disagreement between North Korea and *everybody else* about their pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability."<sup>16</sup>

The resolution also addresses critics' suggestion that this Administration should revert to the previous administration's strategy of direct, bilateral talks with North Korea.<sup>17</sup> First, the resolution, by its terms, supports the six-party talks as the most appropriate venue to bring about the implementation of North Korea's commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.<sup>18</sup> Next, bilateral talks with North Korea directed at securing something resembling the Agreed Framework, which was the bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea directed at resolving the 1994 crisis between the countries, is not something to emulate. North Korea's violation of that agreement is directly responsible for the predicament that exists today. Finally, if North Korea were to ever return to the six-party talks, bilateral talks within that forum are clearly not precluded.<sup>19</sup> It is the policy of the United States to address North Korea's nuclear threats within the forum of the six-party talks, and Ambassador Bolton's work at the United Nations has resulted in the international community advocating North Korea's return to the talks as well.<sup>20</sup>

### **Protecting the United States from Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program**

Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is a clear threat to international peace and security, which is precisely the type of issue the United Nations Security Council was designed to address.<sup>21</sup> Iran has continually defied the international community's demands that Iran cease its nuclear weapons program. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") has found Iran to be in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and

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<sup>15</sup> John R. Bolton, Statement of the United States Representative to the United Nations before the Security Council, July 15, 2006, available at [http://www.un.int/usa/06\\_170.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/06_170.htm).

<sup>16</sup> John Bolton, Remarks of the United States Representative to the United Nations before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the nomination of John Bolton to be the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, July 27, 2006 (emphasis added).

<sup>17</sup> See, e.g., John Kerry, remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the nomination of John Bolton to be the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, July 27, 2006 ("Why not engage in a bilateral one and get the job done? That's what the Clinton administration did.").

<sup>18</sup> Security Council Resolution 1695 ¶¶ 6 & 7.

<sup>19</sup> North Korea is currently not responding to invitations to return to the six-party talks. It has labeled the Treasury Department's designation of Banco Delta Asia SARL as a financial institution of "primary money laundering concern" under Section 311 of the Patriot Act in September 2005 as "sanctions," and is using that action as a "pretext" not to return to the six-party talks. Christopher R. Hill, Prepared Statement of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific hearing regarding North Korean Brinkmanship: Is U.S. Policy Up to the Challenge?, June 29, 2006.

<sup>20</sup> Condoleezza Rice, Remarks of the Secretary of State on Multilateral Talks on North Korea, June 28, 2006, available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69664.htm> (reiterating the view that the United States looks forward to the reengagement of the six-party talks, and noting that the Security Council has expressed a desire for such diplomatic tools).

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Charter art. 24 ("confer[ing] on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security").

called upon Iran to observe such commitments.<sup>22</sup> It was through Ambassador Bolton's leadership that the Security Council is now on record, with the affirmative support of China and Russia—not just their abstentions—demanding that Iran halt its nuclear weapons activities. This is no small feat given that China and Russia have historical engagements with Iran.<sup>23</sup>

Security Council Resolution 1696 “demands” that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and requests a report by the IAEA by August 31, 2006 on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all such activities.<sup>24</sup> More importantly, the resolution expressed its intention to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, i.e., sanctions, if Iran has not complied with this resolution by that date.<sup>25</sup> In this regard, even European media has noted that U.S. participation in the diplomatic process was integral to leading the Security Council to state unequivocally that Iran must halt its nuclear weapons program, and that the Security Council will take appropriate measures if Iran does not so comply.<sup>26</sup>

## Powerful Advocate for U.N. Reform

The United Nations is clearly in need of reform, and one of the reasons President Bush selected John Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations was to lead the charge for U.N. reform.<sup>27</sup> Even Secretary General Kofi Annan has recognized the need for reform. In submitting reform proposals to the United Nations, he stated the following:

The earlier reforms addressed the symptoms, more than the causes, of our shortcomings. It is now time to reach for deeper, more fundamental change. What is needed, and what we now have a precious opportunity to undertake, is a radical overhaul of the entire Secretariat.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶¶ 1, 5, IAEA Doc. No. GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005).

<sup>23</sup> See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002* (noting supply to Iran's WMD programs by companies in Russia and China); Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, pp. 35-36 (Jan. 2001) (noting Russia and China's past support of Iran's nuclear program).

<sup>24</sup> Security Council Resolution 1696 ¶¶ 2 & 7 (July 31, 2006).

<sup>25</sup> Security Council Resolution 1696 ¶ 8. Measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter are “commonly referred to as sanctions.” Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary-General, Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (updated Jan. 2006), available at <http://www.un.org/News/press/docs/2006/sgsm6486.doc.htm>.

<sup>26</sup> See Philippe Boloquin, Nucléaire: Téhéran prêt à des “négociations sérieuses” [Nuclear: Tehran is ready for “serious negotiations”], *Le Monde*, p. 3, Aug. 24, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 14598936 (noting that the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Germany managed to rally Russia and China, two partners of Iran, to the threat of sanctions).

<sup>27</sup> George W. Bush, Remarks of the President in Appointing John Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations, Aug. 1, 2005 (“His mission is now to help the U.N. reform itself.”).

<sup>28</sup> Kofi Annan, Speech of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mar. 7, 2006, available at <http://www.un.org/reform/sgspeech.pdf>. At the conclusion of a high-level plenary meeting in September 2005, the heads of state of the member states of the United Nations directed the Secretary General in the Outcome Document of that meeting to submit reform proposals to the United Nations. This speech was given upon his submission of those reform proposals in the form of a report, *Investing in the United Nations: for a strong Organization worldwide*, U.N. Doc. No. A/670/692 (Mar. 7, 2006).



In this regard, the drive for U.N. reform is not solely a U.S. issue. Meanwhile, any U.N. scandal, or problem of waste, fraud, and abuse, does directly impact the U.S. taxpayer, as the United States contributes 22 percent of the overall U.N. budget, and pays 25 percent of the costs of U.N. peacekeeping operations, specifically.<sup>29</sup>

Already, within one year, Ambassador Bolton has some successes in creating incentives for the United Nations to reform itself. In December 2005, when the General Assembly adopted a \$3.79 billion two-year budget, he led a coalition of states to demand a provision in the budget that limited the organization's expenditures to \$950 million,<sup>30</sup> which amounts to about six months of expenditures of the body.<sup>31</sup> This limitation was meant to serve as a catalyst to reform, as the United States sought to link the budget cap to progress on reform. Opponents of reform, on the other hand, in acceding to the budget cap provision, did not recognize there to be a link between the two issues.

In June 2006, about the time when the United Nations was approaching the \$950 million limit on expenditures, the majority of the member states pushed to remove the budgetary cap. To register its position that the United Nations had not undertaken the reforms necessary to merit the removal of the budget cap, the United States "dissociated" itself from the consensus decision to lift the interim budget cap.<sup>32</sup> Voting on budgetary matters at the United Nations is generally taken by consensus, both in the General Assembly Plenary meetings and in the General Assembly Fifth Committee, which is responsible for budgetary and administrative matters.<sup>33</sup> Japan, which is the second largest contributor to the United Nations by providing close to 20 percent of the overall U.N. budget, also dissociated itself from consensus. Thus, the two largest contributors to the U.N. budget, responsible for 42 percent of the payments, have concluded that the United Nations has not made sufficient progress on reform.

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<sup>29</sup> John Bolton, Prepared Statement of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce, Apr. 5, 2006. The United Nations assesses the United States for 27 percent of the costs of peacekeeping operations, but by law the U.S. contribution is capped at 25 percent. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, § 404(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 103-236.

<sup>30</sup> General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/247 A-C, ¶ 3 (updated Feb. 1, 2006).

<sup>31</sup> Alejandro Wolff, Statement of the United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations before the General Assembly, Dec. 23, 2005, available at [http://www.un.int/usa/05\\_272.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/05_272.htm).

<sup>32</sup> John Bolton, Remarks of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations before the General Assembly Fifth Committee, June 28, 2006, available at [http://www.un.int/usa/06\\_140.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/06_140.htm); Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly 92<sup>nd</sup> Plenary Meeting of the 60<sup>th</sup> Session, June 30, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.92.

<sup>33</sup> The historical shift to a consensus voting procedure is an example of how Congressional withholding of funds to the United Nations can be influential upon U.N. actions. The United Nations adopted consensus voting procedures on matters of budgetary consequence in response to the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment to the FY86-87 State Department Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 143, 99 Stat. 405, 424 (1985), which would have withheld a percentage of U.S. funding from the United Nations unless the United Nations adopted voting procedures on such matters commensurate with and proportionate to a members' financial contribution to the organization, i.e. weighted voting. See John Bolton, Remarks of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations General Assembly, May 8, 2006, available at [http://www.un.int/usa/06\\_109.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/06_109.htm).

This lifting of the budget cap took place after a coalition of Third World nations known as the G-77<sup>34</sup> forced a vote on a resolution addressing reforms in May 2006, in contravention of consensus voting norms.<sup>35</sup> The resolution nominally addressed reforms, but in effect was merely a tactic to delay reforms. It passed by a vote of 121-50.<sup>36</sup> It is crucial to understand the voting permutations in this matter, as it is illustrative of the “culture of inaction” at the United Nations that Ambassador Bolton describes.<sup>37</sup> Specifically, those 121 countries voting to delay reform contribute 12 percent of the U.N. budget, while the 50 nations dedicated to reform constitute 86.7 percent of the contributions to the U.N. budget.<sup>38</sup>

Ambassador Bolton was able to lead the United Nations to modest reforms even in the face of this “culture of inaction.” A week after the budget cap was lifted at the end of June, the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution that implemented certain reform measures the United States had sought.<sup>39</sup> For example, the resolution established a fully operational ethics office, made information technology in the organization more modern, improved financial practices of the body, and provided limited authority, as a first step, to the Secretary General to reallocate staff and resources at his discretion.

This recapitulation of the reform and budget debate illustrates how a “culture of inaction” still pervades the United Nations. It remains dominated in the General Assembly by a coalition of Third World countries who are extremely reluctant to change the inner workings of the United Nations. Ambassador Bolton’s progress with respect to reforms, however, illustrates how he is building and expanding a coalition of states dedicated to reform so that the organization can “renew its founding promises for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>40</sup> If the Senate were to refuse to confirm John Bolton to represent the United States at the United Nations, those countries resisting reform would rightfully question U.S. dedication to these reform efforts.

## Conclusion

Ambassador Bolton’s success in leading the United Nations Security Council to pass resolutions pertaining to Israel/Hezbollah, North Korea, and Iran, and the progress he has led with respect to U.N. reform, demonstrate that his critics’ repeated assertion that he “cannot work with others” is without merit. More importantly, those resolutions and his work at the United Nations directly protect the interests of the United States and its allies. Many authorities have recognized this outstanding work, as five past Secretaries of State, three Secretaries of Defense,

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<sup>34</sup> The Group of 77 (“G-77”), established in June 1964, is now comprised of 132 countries, but retains its name for historical significance.

<sup>35</sup> Bolton, May 8, 2006 (noting that the vote on this resolution in the Fifth Committee was a “breach of the consensus decision-making principle” of the Fifth Committee).

<sup>36</sup> General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/260 (May 16, 2006). There were two abstentions on the vote.

<sup>37</sup> Ambassador Bolton has credited this description to Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve and Chair of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. Bolton, Prepared Statement, July 27, 2006.

<sup>38</sup> Bolton, Prepared Statement, July 27, 2006.

<sup>39</sup> General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/283 (July 7, 2006).

<sup>40</sup> Bush, Aug. 1, 2005.



and over sixty former U.S. Ambassadors have endorsed his nomination.<sup>41</sup> John Bolton deserves an up-or-down vote and Senate confirmation to continue to serve as the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.

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<sup>41</sup> Secretaries of State James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, Al Haig, Henry Kissinger, and George Schultz, as well as Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci, James Schlesinger, and Caspar Weinberger, have all endorsed Ambassador Bolton's nomination. A list of endorsements of the nomination is on file at the RPC.